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RECENT CASES

Rinker's significance lies in its acceptance of the appropriateness of
punitive damages in products liability cases and its tacit expression of a
judicial reluctance to set aside verdicts as inconsistent where they are in
any way legally reconcilable.
MARGARET D. LINEBERRY

SEX-DISCRIMINATORY
SCHOLARSHIP TRUSTS-STATE
UNIVERSITY'S ASSOCIATION
WITH SCHOLARSHIP IS NOT
STATE ACTION
Shapiro v. Columbia Union NationalBank & Trust Co.1
In 1948, Victor Wilson's will established a testamentary trust for the
education of "deserving Kansas City, Missouri boys" to attend Yale University or the University of Kansas City. Recipients were to be selected by
appointees of alumni of the two schools, subject to approval by the named
trustee bank. When the University of Kansas City joined the state university system as the University of Missouri-Kansas City (UMKC), the trustee
perwas ordered to make future awards to that institution, and university
2
sonnel assumed the role of the preliminary selection group.
Disbursements under the Wilson trust flowed directly from trustee to
recipient. 3 Information about the trust was disseminated in the UMKC
undergraduate catalog and applications were provided and processed by
the school financial aid department. A university "professional staff'
reviewed applications and made a tentative award embodied in a recommendation letter. The letter was forwarded to the trustee for approval,
4
after which the university notified the male students of their awards.
In 1972, appellant, a female law student, applied for and was denied a
scholarship funded by the trust. She alleged that she was refused assistance

1. 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
2. 576 S.W.2d at 313. The terms of the will do not directly call for the participation of any state agent or organization. Id. at 320.
3. See id. at 320; Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 11, Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
4. 576 S.W.2d at 317.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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from the trust solely because she was a woman. 5 She brought an action
against the trustee and various university officials 6 claiming the state
agents had participated in a systematic process and procedure violative of
her equal protection rights7 and actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 She
sought damages for the loss of financial aid and invocation of the doctrine
of cy pres to alleviate the illegality by construction or substitution of
"students" or "individuals" for the trust's use of the word "boys." 9
Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted
by the trial court on the ground that appellant's allegation of state action
was insufficient to justify the application of due process and equal protection principles to the trust.' 0 On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals
5. Id. at 314.
6. The Attorney General, known heirs and unknown heirs were also named
as defendants. The Attorney General represents the interests of the public in suits
to construe charitable trusts, Murphey v. Dalton, 314 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1958),
and is a necessary party to such actions. Thatcher v. City of St. Louis, 343 Mo.
597, 122 S.W.2d 915 (1938). Heirs of the trustor-testator also are necessary parties in an action for construction of a trust. Reed v. Eagleton, 384 S.W.2d 578,
590 (Mo. 1964).
7. Shapiro alleged violations of the ninth and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution, as well as the equal protection clause of the
Missouri Constitution. MO. CONST. art. I, § 2.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law], subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
See generally,Developments in the Law-Section 1983 andFederalism,90 HARV.
L. REV. 1133 (1977). The "under color of law" requirement is equivalent to the
fourteenth amendment's state action requirement. Shapiro v. Columbia Union
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 320, 321 & n.23 (Mo. En Banc 1978) (cases

cited).
9. The doctrine of cy pres is expressed as follows:
If property is giVen in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry
out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general
intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not
fail but the court will direct the application of the property to some
charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of
the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). See Flynn v. Danforth, 547
S.W.2d 132, 138-39 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976). See generally Reed v. Eagleton,
384 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1964); Thatcher v. Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d 677
(Mo. 1934).
10. 576 S.W.2d at 314. The trial court's dismissal also rested on other
grounds, including lack of state court jurisdiction for a § 1983 claim, mootness,
official immunity of the defendants, and unavailability of§ 1983 as a civil claim
for damages. This note will not examine that part of the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision holding actions brought under§ 1983 cognizable in a state court.
The Missouri Supreme Court held that the potential mootness caused by appellant's graduation from law school would not preclude a review of the case since it
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/10
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found the petition to be sufficient and reinstated the claim. 1 The Missouri
Supreme Court then heard the case, and concurred in the trial court's
finding of no state action and dismissal of the claim. 12
Shapiro is a case of first impression in Missouri, 13 and in some respects,
the United States.1 4 There have been at least two prior cases in which
scholarship trusts have been challenged on sex discrimination grounds.1 5
Shapiro, however, is the first reported decision in which a would-be recipient's claim of sex discrimination in the administration of such a trust has
been decided on constitutional grounds, and the first in which the 1983 action was employed. The dismissal of Shapiro's claim hinged upon the
court's evaluation of the unique relationship of a state university to a
private scholarship trust and the unclear limits of the state action concept.
By its express terms the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment applies only to the state. 16 Private conduct, "however discriminatory and wrongful," is not subject to the constraints of due process
and equal protection; 17 indeed, the Shapiro court unqualifiedly labeled

was of great public importance. 576 S.W.2d at 315 n.7. The court's disposition of
the case made it unnecessary to consider the remaining grounds.
11. Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. KCD28222,
slip op. at 17 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977), transferred, 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. En
Banc 1978).
12. 576 S.W.2d at 322.
13. Id. at 312.
14. Although scholarship trusts containing sex restrictions have surfaced in
past cases, the gender provisions of such a trust have not been the focus of the litigation. See Note, Sex Restricted Scholarshipsand the CharitableTrust, 59 IOWA
L. REV. 1000, 1000 (1974). Most surprising, are the relatively recent decisions in
which courts have declared a restriction based on race unconstitutional or unenforceable, without even questioning the legality of a sex restriction in the same
trust. See, e.g., Vaughn Estate, 69 D. & C.2d 32 (Pa. 1974) (home for aged and
infirm white women); Dunbar v. Board of Trustees, 461 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1969)
(school for poor, white, male orphans); Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (home for aged white men). See generally Annot., 25
A.L.R.3d 736 (1969).
15. Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 496, 375 A.2d 998 (1977); Ebitz v.
Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 361 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 1977).
16. "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961),
quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). In Evans v. Newton,'382 U.S.
296, 300 (1966) the Court said, "[i]f a testator wanted to leave a school or center
for the use of one race only and in no way implicated the State ... we assume
arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered." See also First
Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 821 (1975) (privately administered
charitable trust for care of hospital patients "born of white parents in the United
States" held valid). But see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (private
conduct interfering with fourteenth amendment rights can be proscribed by
statute).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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private discrimination as beneficial to society. 18Therefore, as Ms. Shapiro
conceded, a purely private settlor is free to discriminate on the basis of sex
in his choice of beneficiaries, so long as the administration of the trust is
likewise private.19
The Shapiro court's threshold task was a search for state action in the
administration and operation of the Wilson trust. The court began its
analysis with the proposition that UMKC, and therefore the state, was unquestionably connected with the administration of the trust. 19 But, it said,
more than a nominal connection is required: "The question is is the 'involvement' of the University so pervasive or extensive that the involvement
constitutes state action. 20 Although it purported to give the Shapiro petition "its broadest intendment," 2' a majority of the court concluded that
the allegations contained in the petition did not demonstrate sufficient
state involvement. By its dismissal at the pleading stage, the court foreclosed further development of the facts, 22 over the objections of three
23
dissenting judges.

18. 576 S.W.2d at 318.
19. 576 S.W.2d at 316. It has been held that, "it is undisputed that the University of a state is subject to the provisions and constitutional restraint of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution and its
amendments apply to college campuses." Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 416
F. Supp. 1350, 1371 (W.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 558 F.2d 848 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). See also Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), appealafter remand, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
20. 576 S.W.2d at 316-17. The court did not distinguish between the state
and federal equal protection clauses for purposes of its state action analysis.
21. Id. at 312.
22. For example, there could have been facts developed which supported
the contentions in appellant's brief but not in her petition that the private trustee
participated in the selection process merely by "rubber-stamping" UMKC's nominations. This was a principal basis for Judge Simeone's dissent. 576 S.W.2d at
323. Shapiro also contended in her brief but not her petition that the money
available from the more than four million dollar principal of the Wilson trust
made up three-fourths of all available funds, thereby creating a virtually entirely
sex-discriminatory scholarship program at a public university. See Appellant's
Brief at 12, Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310
(Mo. En Banc 1978). The court did not discuss and presumably did not consider
either contention. 576 S.W.2d at 315 n.6.
23. Id. at 322-24. The dissenting opinion by Judge Donnelly, concurred in
by Judge Seiler, argued that the facts of the case were too important to permit dismissal on the pleadings. The opinion's lengthy quotation from Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), however, is misleading to the extent that it implies
the state action question cannot properly be decided upon a motion to dismiss;
Scheuer is not authority for that proposition. Scheuer addressed the unique question of dismissal on the pleadings for a defendant who relies on the defense of
qualified immunity. That defense's requirements of good faith and action within
the scope of duties are peculiarly factual determinations, and Scheuer holds that
once raised, these issues are not to be decided without further proceedings. State
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/10
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The Shapiro court applied what it called the ultimate state action test:
the "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" formula of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.2 4 In Burton, the United States Supreme
Court explained that private conduct becomes state action when government "to some significant extent" becomes involved "through any arrangement, management, funds or property." 25 A court using this test to
determine if state action is present must sift and weigh mutual contacts
and entanglements between state and private actors. 26 Applying the Burton test to the Shapiro petition, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded:
The dissemination of information by the University in a catalog
and by other means, the accepting and processing of applications
by the financial aid office, the determining of academic standards
and financial needs, the making of a "tentative award" or the
"nomination" and forwarding the names of qualified male students to the private trustee which "approve" the names of the male
does not in our
students and which finally award the scholarship
27
opinion rise to the level of state action.
Shapiro illustrates the inadequacy of the sifting and weighing test. By
its avoidance of the "impossible task"28 of fixing definitive state action
rules, the United States Supreme Court has made it necessary for lower
courts to sift and weigh not only the facts of the case before them but the
melange of Supreme Court decisions on the subject as well. 29 The Shapiro
action, however, may be properly decided upon a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978) (upholding dismissal for failure
to state a claim, no state action).
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25. Id. at 722.
26. See cases cited note 29 infra.
27. 576 S.W.2d at 320. The Burton plaintiff alleged racial discrimination
by a private restaurant operating in a public parking garage under lease from a
public agency. The Supreme Court said such an arrangement was constitutionally impermissible because in effect the city had "elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination" thus giving the appearance of governmental approval. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. at 725.
The Shapiro court, although it purported to rely on Burton, did not refer to
this aspect of the decision. The court did not consider whether UMKC's actions,
especially the promotion of the trust through its undergraduate catalog and the
furnishing of applications and personnel, were equivalent to those of the city in
Burton so that the discrimination by the trust appeared to be authorized by the
state. Had it done so, it may have reached a contrary result.
28. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
29. It is possible to divide the numerous state action cases into three categories based on their fact patterns. The public function theory is applied to find
state action where a private actor performs a service which is traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) (holding no state action). See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,-98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978). The argument has not
been successful that education and financing education are public functions,
perhaps because such a theory would eliminate parochial schools. See Grossner v.
Published
by University
of Missouri
School287
of Law
Scholarship
1979(S.D.N.Y. 1968); but
535,Repository,
549 & n.19
Univ.,
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opinion is a superficial application of the test. The court mentions the major Supreme Court state action decisions but evinces no effort to relate the
indicia of state involvement in Shapiro to that in any of those cases; its brief
discussion of a Missouri Supreme Court state action case is marred by its
misstatement of the holding of the caseA0 The Shapiro court's vague and
conclusory treatment of the state action question is excusable only because
it is symptomatic of the equally vague and much criticized state action
doctrine. 31

see Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D.
La.), vacated, 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
See also Note, Restricted Scholarships, State Universities and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 56 VA. L. REV. 1454, 1460-62 (1970). Another category of state action cases is that in which the state has commanded or encouraged the private
discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Application of neutral principles of trust
construction is not state action under the Shelley doctrine. Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435, 446 (1970). The final category is that which encompasses all other state
action cases, where state action is found by sifting and weighing mutual contacts
and entanglements between state and private actors. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (receipt by segregated school of state-provided schoolbooks made private school's discriminatory policies state action); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (entanglements between restaurant and its public landlord made-former's discriminations state action). But see
Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (issuance of liquor license
to race-restricted club not sufficient state action); First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth,
523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. En Banc 1975) (partial subsidization of hospitals not sufficient state action to support attack on racially restricted trust fund for patients).
See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451-76 (1978); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L.
REV. 1083 (1960).
30. See 576 S.W.2d at 317-20. The Shapiro court said no invidious discrimination was found in First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. En Banc
1975), which involved a health care trust for whites. In fact, Danforth, like
Shapiro, was decided on the state action issue and the Danforth court never examined the invidiousness of the trust's race restriction. Had it found state action
and proceeded to do so, it is beyond doubt that the discrimination would indeed
have been found to be "invidious" or "arbitrary, irrational and not reasonably
related to a legitimate purpose." United States ex rel. Buonoraba v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 F. Supp. 556, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
31. Commentary on the state action doctrine has labeled it "a conceptual
disaster area," Black, Forward:'State A ction,'Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967), and "impractical and obsolete."
Goldstein, Death and Transfiguration of the State Action Doctrine-Moose
Lodge v. Irvis to Runyon v. McCrary, 4 HASTINGS L.Q. 1, 23 (1977). See also
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading Searchfor 'StateAction' Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 SO. CAL. L. REV. 146 (1957); Silard, A Constitutional
Forecast:Demise of the State Action Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 346
(1963).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/10
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Two lines of argument in support of the finding of no state action may
be discerned in the Shapiro decision, although neither is fully developed.
The first centers upon the court's conception of the role of the UMKC
actors in the trust fund distribution process as being ministerial while the
trustee possessed the discretionary power. 2 Based upon its reading of the
record the majority deduced that:
The agents of the University, under the will, do not have the power
to "select," or "determine," or "ultimately and finally determine" those qualified "boys" who finally are awarded scholarship
funds. The trustee has that power. The trustee has the power to
"approve" male applicants. The power to "approve" includes the
power to "disapprove." The final and
last act of "selection" is left
33
to and is that of the private trustee.
It is not clear why having the power to disapprove the names of
nominees was seen as more significant for state action purposes than the
time-consuming functions performed by the university: both roles could
be characterized as state action.3 4 The discretion the university possessed in
choosing who to recommend to the trustee, an essential prerequisite to the
granting of aid, also was given little attention by the court.3 5 Because the
court cited no authority for its emphasis upon an actor's power to
"ultimately and finally determine" beneficiaries, this key part of the
opinion does little to clarify the basis for the Shapiro holding and provides
no guidelines for future litigation.
The court's invocation of a ministerial/discretionary dichotomy for
purposes of analyzing the state's role raises some interesting questions. Indeed, the conclusion that there existed such a dichotomy in the actual ad32. Although the majority did not use this term it did emphasize the state
actors' lack of discretion in performance of their role in the administration process, noting that "[t]he university has no discretion under the terms of the trust to
forward the names of women to the private trustee; the discretion exists only as to
those members within the class who are recommended for final selection by the
trustee." 576 S.W.2d at 321. Furthermore, Judge Simeone, in his dissent, said
"[t]he acts of the University are more than ministerial," obviously in reference to
the majority position. Id. at 323.
33. Id. at 320-21.
34. A university's nomination of an appropriately restricted class of students to receive funds from an outside source makes the university a
party to the private discrimination ....
The use of the state facilities,
personnel and records which would be required to perform the nominating function is indistinguishable from the state involvement interdicted in Burton, where the Court condemned the state's election "to
place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination."
Note, Restricted Scholarships, State Universities and the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 VA. L. REV. 1454, 1457-58 (1970), quoting Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). But see Comment, Constitutionalityof
Restricted Scholarships, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 604, 614 (1958).
35. 576 S.W.2d at 321. See note 32 supra. See also text accompanying note
39 infra.
Published
by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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ministration of the trust seems highly questionable. The skeletal record
before the court3 6 revealed only that the university made a tentative award
which was then approved by the trustee.37 Giving these uncontroverted
allegations their "broadest intendment," would seem to require a construction consistent with Shapiro's arguments on appeal that the trustee
had mere veto powers and in essence "rubber-stamped" approval of the
university-nominated candidates.38
Furthermore, the ministerial/discretionary analysis implies that only
one step in the two step process of nomination and approval can be a significant one, and that the conclusion that the trustee had the final decision
was the determinative factor in the case. Under the Burton sifting and
weighing test, however, it would seem that even if the nomination role
were only a ministerial one, it should have been viewed in connection with
the university's other entanglements, e.g., publicization and supplying
and processing of applications.
Finally, the court's emphasis upon the fact that the will and the terms
of the trust gave the university no discretion to choose women seems misplaced. The school's decision to cooperate with the trustee was undeniably
a conscious, significant and discretionary act. UMKC could have conditioned its participation upon the trustee obtaining a construction of the
trust as constitutional, or upon removal of the restrictive clause, as have
similarly situated schools in the past. 9 The Shapiro court, however, gave
no consideration to this aspect of the school's participation as potential
state action.
The Shapiro court's second rationale emphasized the inapplicability of
the findings of state action in two groups of cases involving racially discriminatory charitable trusts.

40

The court first distinguished the cases in

36. The court considered the petition, answers to interrogatories and allegations raised by the motions to dismiss. 576 S.W.2d at 317.
37. Id. at 316 &n.11.
38. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
39. See Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961)
(Amherst College refused to accept trusteeship for scholarship trust limited to
Protestant-Gentile boys unless religious restriction eliminated). See also Clark,
CharitableTrusts, The FourteenthAmendment, and the Will of stephen Girard,

66 YALE L.J. 979, 981 n.8 (1957) (reference to school which refused to accept
$50,000,000 gift conditioned upon exclusion of Jews and blacks).
40. Some courts have suggested that the state action test applied in race discrimination cases should be more sensitive than that used in connection with
other equal protection violations. See Wiese v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d
Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). The Supreme Court, however, has refused to accept
such a balancing approach. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 374 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
The Shapiro court apparently applied a neutral state action test; it nowhere
suggested that the nature of the alleged discrimination is part of the state action
test. Thus, the Shapiro court would presumably have reached the same result had
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/10
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which a public agent or agency serves as trustee for the discriminatory
trust, an1 arrangement that consistently has been held to constitute state
4

action.
42
The court was equally unpersuaded by the second group of cases,
which involved private trustees but selection for benefits by public offi43
cials. These are exemplified by Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler. In Stabler,
funds from a discrhninatory scholarship trust were distributed by a private
trustee to beneficiaries chosen by a selection committee composed of present and past public officials. 44 In finding state action and ordering the
trustee to ignore the racial restriction the Delaware judge said:
State action quite clearly cannot be measured entirely by what is
said in the governing instrument. If it were, a document could be
used as a shield to insulate action from judicial inquiry.
I conclude that the law looks not only to the formal documents
but also to the way
creating or structuring the trust or other entity
45
in which its affairs are actually conducted.
The Shapiro court seemed less anxious than the Delaware court to look
beyond the form required by the documents to the substance of the actual
as it might have been found to be,
selection process of the Wilson trust
46
upon an expanded factual record.
While the argument for distinguishing Shapiro from the public trustee
cases may be cogent, the distinction is less clear between Shapiro and the
private-trustee/public-selector cases. It is significant that in none of the
public-selector cases distinguished by the majority was the award decision

the Wilson trust been for whites only rather than for boys only. See generally
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-State Action-Hiringand Promotion Practices
of Private University Receiving Public Funds Held State Action-Braden v.
University of Pittsburgh, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1401, 1416-17 & n.99 (1977); Comment, Restricted Scholarships: Problems in Standing to Challenge, Constitutionality, Cy Pres,and Legislative Policy, 1963 WIs. L. REV. 254, 303-07 (1963).
41. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Pennsylvania v. Board of
Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). See also 26 Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 52 at 6 (July 1,
1961) ("Where a public school district is the trustee of a charitable trust, discriminatory limitations on the trust based on race, religion, national origin, or sex are
void and unenforceable") (emphasis added).
42. Without further explanation, the court said that "[t]his case is not
equivalent to" those situations. 576 S.W.2d at 321.
43. 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973). See also cases cited 576 S.W.2d at 321
n.22.
44. As in Shapiro, the Stabler trust instrument itself made no provision for
state involvementi; the trustees had been empowered to devise the selection process. Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534, 536-37 (Del. Ch. 1973).
45. Milford Trust Co. v. Stabler, 301 A.2d 534, 537 (Del. Ch. 1973).
46. It is not clear that the court even felt obligated to consider the substance
over form argument, since it was not raised in the petition. See note 22 and acsupra.School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
companying.
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by Universitytext
of Missouri

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 10

584

MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44

made solely by public officers, yet state action was found in each case.4 7 In
each factual setting there was a combination of public and private input
into the choice of recipients, at least arguably equivalent to the Shapiro
fact pattern. However, as it did in its ministerial/discretionary argument, 48 the Shapiro court relied on the technical structure of the selection
procedure for its distinction.4 9 In the court's mind no further explanation
was necessary. The trustee had the final decision, not the state actor;
therefore, the latter could not, under the facts pleaded, be said to have insinuated itself to a significant degree into the trust administration.
The Shapiro court might have found state action had it applied an
alternative theory. In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,50 the Supreme
Court held that a city's grant of exclusive use of public recreational facilities to a racially segregated YMCA group was unconstitutional state action
subsidizing the discriminatory practices.51 By the same token it could have
been inferred from the Shapiro record that UMKC's performance of the
nomination, publicization, and screening functions represented substantial subsidization of the administration of the sex-discriminatory Wilson
trust.5 2 The critical determination under Gilmore would then be whether

the aid given the trust was a generalized government service like police or
fire protection, which would not constitute state action, or something
more. 53 How to characterize UMKC's unique role as promoter, middle47.

See, e.g., Wachovia Bank &Trust Co. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665

(D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Milford Trust Co. v.
Stabler, 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973); In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del.
Ch. 1970); Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 225 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969).
48. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
49. The court said:
The final decision whether an individual is awarded a scholarship is that
of the private trustee. The "process and procedure" of the University has
not so far "insinuated itself' in the administration of the trust so that the
action is that of the state nor can the challenged action be treated as ultimately that of the state.
576 S.W.2d at 321.
50. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
51. Id. at 569. The Court expressly refused to consider the constitutionality
of a grant of non-exclusive access to these facilities. Id. at 570. This situation
would be more closely analogous to that in Shapiro, in which UMKC financial aid
personnel and facilities presumably were occupied with Wilson trust dudes only
part of the time. See note 22 supra (appellant's allegation Wilson trust funds constituted three-fourths of all available UMKC scholarship monies).
52. Nothing in the record indicates that the services of the university were
paid for by the settlor or trustee. Nor is there any indication the court considered
the question of how valuable these services were.
53. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974). "Traditional state monopolies, such as electricity, water, and police and fire protection
- all generalized government services -do not by their mere provision constitute
a showing of state involvement in invidious discrimination." Id. at 574, citing
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973). The Court said the same was true
of municipal recreational facilities such as parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities,
amphitheaters, museums and zoos. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/10
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man and nominator for the Wilson trust is a question not reached by the
54
Shapiro court and not easily answered under the Supreme Court cases.
The subsidy analysis might well have led the Shapiro court to a finding of
state action. 55
Shapiro is not the first case in which a scholarship trust has been chal56
lenged on sex discrimination grounds. InEbitz v. PioneerNationalBank,
female law students sued a private trustee in equity for construction of a
trust established "to aid and assist worthy and ambitious young men to acquire a legal education.15 7 The plaintiffs alleged that a sex discriminatory
construction of the trust terms would violate the Massachusetts and United
States constitutions. The Massachusetts Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question by interpreting the word "men" as ambiguous and
construing it generically to encompass women. The court ordered the
trustee to apply the same criteria to applicants of both sexes. The court
stated that to the extent the trust's ambiguity was not resolved by the findings of fact regarding the testator's intent, the state's policy against sex
discrimination would supply the additional justification for the holding. 8
The disposition of the case made it unnecessary to consider the plaintiff's
fourteenth amendment argument. 59
54. The applicability of the nebulous subsidy theory and the importance of
the exclusivity of use factor and the distinction between sex and race discrimination in this context are subjects beyond the scope of this note. See generally J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
68-71 (1978); Goldstein, Death and Transfiguration of the State Action Doctrine-Moose Lodge v. Iruis to Runyon v. McCrary, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1,
20-23 (1977).
55. See Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir.
1975) (Gilmore subsidy theory applied to sex discrimination, but city's waiver of
$25 yearly fee for use of baseball fields by sex discriminatory group held de minimis; no state action); Ridgefield Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v. Fossi, 458 F.
Supp. 117 (D.C. Conn. 1978) (Gilmoresubsidy theory applied to hold town's conveyance of property for nominal consideration to sex discriminatory Boy's Club
illegal).
56. 361 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 1977).
57. Id. at 225 n.4.
58. Id. at 227.
59. The court seemed to imply that a charitable trust's mere existence
was sufficient to subject it to the state's constitutional equal protection requirements. While the charitable trust is often said to be a favorite of equity, this
argument has not been successful absent some additional state action showing.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 822 (Mo. En Banc), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Voelker v. St. Louis Mercantile Library Ass'n, 359
S.W.2d 689, 693-94 (Mo. 1962); Buchanan v. Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, 142-43,
136 S.W. 415, 421-22 (1911).
Shapiro could have strengthened her case under the Burton test by calling attention to the many special benefits given charitable trusts under state (and
federal tax) law. See generally Note, Sex Restricted Scholarshipsand the Charitable Trust, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1000, 1005-06 (1974). For cases considering the
question of tax-exemption as state action, see id. at 1005 n.50. Under Burton, a
plaintiff is wise to allege as many individual state involvements as possible. See,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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The trustee or selection committee may institute the equal protection
challenge to a sex discriminatory trust, as illustrated by Lockwood v.
Killian.60 In Lockwood, application for instructions from the court was
made by the members of a selection committee for a scholarship fund
restricted to needy Hartford County caucasian boys of a particular religious faith.61 They sought removal of the objectionable terms, including
the sex limitation, on the ground the trust had become illegal or impractical. The court held that a further examination of possible alternatives for
accomplishing the settlor's purpose was needed and remanded without
ruling on the constitutionality of the various restrictions. 62 As selection
committee for the Wilson trust, UMKC could have mounted a challenge to
that trust's sex-discriminatory provisions, and a similar situation would
have developed. It seems likely, however, that the impetus for a sizeable
number of future cases will come, as in Shapiro, from disappointed mem63
bers of the excluded sex.
Had the Shapiro court found state action in the allegations regarding
the Wilson trust's administration a further finding of unconstitutionality
would have been unavoidable. The trust would then have been subject to
64
the same strict equal protection requirements to which states are held.
e.g., Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (25 separate state
contacts alleged); In re Estate of Bishop, 53 Hawaii 604, 611-12, 499 P.2d 670,
675 (1972) (court cites attorney general's role asparenspatriaeof charitable trusts
as alternative basis for state action finding).
60. 172 Conn. 496, 375 A.2d 998 (1977).
61. Id. at 497-98, 375 A.2d 1000.
62. Id. at 509, 375 A.2d 1005.
63. Shapiro is the first reported decision in which a § 1983 action has been
used in a would-be beneficiary's attack on a scholarship trust. The Missouri
Supreme Court's apparent approval of its use for this purpose could encourage
future plaintiffs to file in federal courts, given what might be perceived as a lack
of receptiveness in Missouri state courts. It should be noted that the Shapiro court
expressly reserved judgment on the question of what damages would be available
in a § 1983 action. 576 S.W.2d at 315 n.8.
64. Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710, 713-14 (Del. Ch. 1969),
citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). The Shapiro court's brief reference
to the balancing of educational opportunity and testator's wishes, 576 S.W.2d at
321, should not be misconstrued. Shapiro's claim must be distinguished from
those in which the trust or will is attacked on public policy and not equal protection
grounds. When the trust is attacked on public policy grounds, the competing
public policies are considered; but if state action is present, the search is for a
violation of a constitutional right regardless of competing public policy. For example, a trust's charitable tax exemption may be withheld if the trust is found to
be violative of public policy after a balancing of the policy favoring testatorial
freedom and that against the particular form of discrimination. See, e.g., Green
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)
(racially discriminatory private schools, private contributors thereto, not entitled
to federal tax exemption under I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(c)(2), respectively);
I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 7744007 (July 28, 1977) ("If -administrators of a
scholarship fund are required to name only male scholarship recipients, such a
classification based on sex is not against declared Federal public policy and is
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/10
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Although these standards are not absolutely clear in the sex discrimination
area, 65 at the very least a gender-based classification probably must be
shown to serve important governmental objectives and be substantially
related to their achievement. 66 Legal authorities no longer recognize
greater need of males than of females for a university education; " defending any sex distinction in such a trust's terms would seem a difficult prop68

osition.

In an important footnote to its decision, 69 the Shapiro court expressly
declined to consider the applicability of the 1972 amendments to Title IX
of the Higher Education Act. 70 The relevant section provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
72
Although Shapiro's claim accrued before passage of the amendments,
one commentator has suggested the statute could be a basis for an alternative means of attack in future litigation against sex-discriminatory
scholarship trusts.7 3 The success of this theory will entail a liberal interpre-

educationally and socially beneficial to the community at large. Accordingly, it is
held that the restriction contained in the decedent's will authorizing scholarships
to only males is not a bar to a charitable deduction under [I.R.C. § 2055]"). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 377, Comment c (1957).
65. Vorchheimer v. School District, 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703
(1977); Ginzberg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451
(1978).
66. Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See also Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199 (1977); In re Interest of J.D.C., 498 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Mo. 1973).
67. See Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No.
KCD28222, slip op. at 18 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977), transferred,576 S.W.2d 310
(Mo. En Banc 1978); 26 Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 52 at 5 (July 1, 1969).
68. See generally Note, Sex Restricted Scholarships and the Charitable
Trust, 59 IOwA L. REv. 1000, 1008-15 (1974); Note, Restricted Scholarships,
State Universities and the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 VA. L. REV. 1454,
1471-74 (1970).
69. 576 S.W.2d at 322 n.24.
70. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976). Shapiro did not raise the issue. 576
S.W.2d at 322 n.24.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
72. The amendments were passed June 23, 1972. The Shapiro petition
alleged a denial of assistance on April 1, 1972. Second Amended Petition of
Marilyn Shapiro, Appellant's Brief at A-6, Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
73. See Note, Sex Restricted Scholarships and the Charitable Trust, 59
IOWA L. REv. 1000, 1016-19 (1974).
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tation of the statutory language 4 and remedy. 7 No court has yet been
faced with the question, but the statute may provide an indirect remedy
7 6
even where no state action can be demonstrated.
The Missouri Supreme Court could have given Ms. Shapiro's petition
and the concept of state action a broader reading had it been inclined to
do so. But the court's ostensibly conservative posture may be attributable
to a vague and overly general petition. Shapiro's arguments on appeal that
in substance the private trustee's role was a perfunctory "rubber-stamping" and that the state agents in effect made the final selections should
have been included in the petition but were not. As a result, the court may
have assumed the Wilson trust operated in accordance with its established
scheme.
Given the pleadings, Shapiro may stand for nothing more than the
proposition that state participation which is in form only ministerial will
not be viewed as state action absent allegations of something more in the
petition. More liberally interpreted, the effect of the decision could be to
preserve a private settlor's right to discriminate as to the sex of scholarship
beneficiaries as long as state participation in the trust is non-discretionary.
Thus, despite the increasingly sensitive national attitude toward sex
discrimination, it may be that a carefully structured sex discriminatory
trust can, under Shapiro, continue to be promoted and ministerially attended by agents of the State of Missouri. Additional challenges to scholarship trusts, in which the plaintiff alleges all potential indicia of state
74. In particular, a charitable trust's tax-exempt status might have to be
found to represent receipt of "Federal financial assistance," and the trust itself
might have to qualify as an "education program or activity." Note, Sex Restricted
Scholarshipsand the Charitable Trust, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1000, 1016-18 (1974).
Another theory is that UMKC's financial aid program is itself the "program or activity" which receives "Federal financial assistance" in the form of federal scholarships and grants for which it acts as conduit.
75. A statutory remedy for violations of § 1681 is provided in § 1682. Under
that section, the federal agency which extends financial assistance to the discriminatory program must terminate the assistance. An argument can be made (see
note 74supra) that the Internal Revenue Service could thus be compelled to order
the disallowance of the trust's charitable tax exemption, and the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to discontinue offering federal aid through the
UMKC financial aid department. This could pressure a trustee or selection committee to seek a construction of the trust to allow non-discriminatory awards.
Courts have split, however, on the availability of a private right of action under
§ 1681. See Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 781 n.1 (D.C.
Ohio 1976) (private action upheld); Trent v. Perritt, 391 F. Supp. 171, 173 (S.D.
Miss. 1975) (private action implicitly upheld); contra, Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976). See
also Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150, 153
(W.D. Okla. 1977) (private action, if available, only so after exhaustion of administrative remedies provided by § 1682).
76. The requisite showing of tax-exemption under this theory probably does
not in itself constitute state action. See note 59 supra.
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